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Cinephilia and Philosophia: Or, Why I Don’t Show The Matrix in Philosophy 101 
Timothy Yenter 
<A>Introduction<\> 
Philosophy has discovered film. 
More precisely but less pithily, academic philosophers who have not been significantly 
influenced by French intellectual movements of the last forty years have suddenly begun 
publishing books and essays about film in unprecedented numbers. Open Court has ninety-nine 
published volumes in their “Popular Culture and Philosophy” series, with thirteen more volumes 
announced.1 Blackwell currently has forty-four titles in their “And Philosophy” series.2 Not all of 
these volumes are about films, but, given that these volumes started in 2000, the trend is notable. 
Additionally, there is a new academic market for philosophy and film. Specifically designed to 
provide “dependable resources for those studying and teaching philosophy and film,” Routledge 
has a “Philosophers on Film” series with eight edited volumes focusing mostly on recent films, 
as well as multiple books introducing “philosophy and film” and “philosophy through film.”3 In 
the last twenty years, at least three journals (Film-Philosophy [1996], Film and Philosophy 
[1997], and Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image [2010]) and one organization 
(Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts) specifically devoted to the 
connections between film and philosophy have appeared. This is in addition to the numerous 
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monographs written by philosophers about films, filmmakers, and genres, as well as traditional 
issues in aesthetics. 
These latter resources are primarily geared toward scholars and “philosophy of film” 
courses. The shelves of film and philosophy books should have made it considerably easier to 
teach with films in introductory philosophy classes, and certainly many philosophers have found 
them useful. However, shortcomings of many of these pop culture volumes (which I discuss in 
the next section) make these works rarely useful in the classroom. I propose instead a new model 
for how to teach film in a philosophy class. The model develops the virtues inherent in cinephilia 
and connects these virtues to the good life. Discussions of the good life are some of the oldest 
recognizably philosophical questions. According to a common taxonomy, the three traditional 
questions of philosophy are “what is there?,” “what can I know?,” and “how should I live?” The 
third question is the question of the good life; it prompts the questioner to reflect on who she is, 
her place in the world, her values, and how to attain a life that embodies those values. In the third 
section, I expand and situate this question more fully. This question has been and should 
continue to be an important part of philosophy, and this opens a space for cinephilia to inform 
teaching philosophy by posing an appreciable approach to life, love, and art while avoiding some 
problems with the more popular methods of using films and film clips in philosophy classes. 
Finally, I address and respond to two objections to my proposal, then conclude by sharing my 
experiences enacting this pedagogy. 
<A>The Problem of “Philosophy through Film”<\> 
The pop culture and philosophy books that dominate the philosophy shelves at 
bookstores have three major shortcomings. These books are written with fans already in mind, so 
they assume that you already love the Harry Potter books or Doctor Who or Woody Allen, and 
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proceed from there to draw out a philosophical point or two. The goal is often minimal (such as 
to inform fans that some philosophers have also written about the themes or ideas that lurk in 
their work), so too frequently these book chapters fail to engage their objects in a philosophically 
sophisticated manner. Many people writing in the pop culture and philosophy books really do 
love their subjects. Many are knowledgeable about their subjects. Yet very few manage to 
engage with anything else written on the subject, and almost never with anything from film or 
media studies. By setting minimal goals, failing to do interesting philosophy, and failing to 
engage broadly and reflectively, these essays too often have limited value for the classroom. 
More thoughtful and more rigorous work is being done by those interested in philosophy 
through film. In these articles and books, it is claimed that a film does or is philosophy, and it is 
our role as viewers to discover and evaluate this philosophical idea or argument. The Man Who 
Shot Liberty Valance prompts a discussion of whether history progresses and has meaning. 
Crimes and Misdemeanors advocates moral relativism. 12 Monkeys contains a thesis about 
determinism, free will, and time travel. In each case, the philosopher poses either that the film (1) 
embodies a position or, in some stronger versions of the philosophy through film thesis, (2) 
presents an argument for a thesis. These approaches share a commitment to treating films as 
content-bearers. The viewer is expected to treat films as advancing, holding, or assuming a 
theoretical position; in the classroom, we could uncover this meaning through priming in the 
readings or through classroom discussion. 
While this isn’t the case in the best of the philosophy through film texts, in teaching it is 
tempting to treat the film as an accessible and less sophisticated text that gently ushers the 
student into a more complex engagement with written texts or a discussion predetermined by a 
professor. To pull a common example, say you are teaching skepticism in Philosophy 101. The 
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anthology has a selection from Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, and G. E. Moore’s “Certainty.” You’re thinking about how 
to introduce global skepticism to undergraduates, and you decide The Matrix would serve nicely. 
After running through the reasons for doubt from the Meditations, you pull up a YouTube clip of 
Morpheus explaining to Neo how the matrix works, then ask students to consider whether there 
is any way to tell if they are in the matrix. If students begin to discuss how the film employs déjà 
vu as a technique to determine that there is a glitch in the matrix, you gently correct them to say 
that, no, you are not asking how to tell if you are in the matrix according to the rules of the 
movie but how to tell if you are in a simulation right now. You never considered The Matrix as a 
film but simply as way of illustrating or highlighting or delaying a point that you wanted to 
make. One danger of treating films as content-bearers is that they can be too easily contorted 
away from the film and toward some further point.  
Using film clips to make some point beyond what is happening in the film is not a great 
harm. Films, like written texts, do not have only one legitimate, predetermined use. However, 
using films only in this way is too limiting. When we consider the possibilities contained within 
cinephilia to encourage students to develop curiosity, seek out new experiences, and appreciate 
artistic achievement, we find a way to go further. 
A second and related danger is turning films into mere illustrations. Thomas Wartenberg 
has argued that illustrations can be philosophical and thus treating films as illustrations can be a 
way of treating them as philosophical works.4 In this and other ways, proponents of philosophy 
through film, screened philosophy, or film-philosophy argue that films should be taken seriously 
as philosophical texts. I have various concerns about these claims, but we can set those aside for 
now. Pedagogically, using films as illustrations or thought experiments may have some use, but 
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these are one-off opportunities. Students watch a film clip (or a whole film) and are told that it 
poses a problem or possible solution; then, the lecture or discussion continues. La Jetée or 12 
Monkeys illustrates a coherent theory of time travel, for instance, while discussing what theories 
of personal identity are consistent with time travel narratives. The film itself is illustrative at best 
and redundant at worst. If it succeeds at illustrating time travel, or the cost to embracing 
utilitarianism, or the notion that violent protection of the community inevitably turns back on the 
community, it does so only be reducing the film to a single example, idea, or argument. 
Illustrations can easily narrow, simplify, or distort. Furthermore, to have pedagogical value, the 
instructor may need to introduce sophisticated interpretative techniques that students may not yet 
possess, a defense of his or her preferred interpretation, and the complex debates that the film 
can be seen as addressing. The realities of limited time during the semester make this prospect 
unappealing if the film is doing something that can be done without the film. 
In cinephilia we can consider how students might learn to ask their own questions, seek 
their own problems, and find their own things to appreciate. The long-term value of this is 
missing from the illustrative model. Put another way, a philosopher could use Freaky Friday to 
address theories of personal identity, but helping students become intellectually curious will 
allow them to pose their own questions about Freaky Friday or The Loneliest Planet or 
Metropolis. In the next two sections, I develop a model of using film in philosophy classes that 
connects the cinephiliac’s passionate approach to films with the philosopher’s intellectual and 
lived pursuit of the good life. This model doesn’t extinguish the goods of the content-bearer 
model, but it provides further goods that can justify and enrich the screening and discussing of 
films.5 
 6 
<A>What Are We Talking About?<\> 
I will be arguing that cinephilia provides a model of engaged teaching in philosophy and 
related disciplines. Before proceeding to the argument, I will introduce the major concepts I’m 
addressing: cinephilia and the good life. 
Cinephilia evolves, yet it is still linked to its etymological origin--the love of film, of 
cinema. Much of what has been written about cinephilia focuses on its emergence and the related 
development of the auteur theory among French critics and filmmakers of the 1960s. The debate 
about cinephilia in the last two decades has often focused on the extent to which the two 
concepts are separable or should be separated, or whether there is an American cinephilia distinct 
from French cinephilia (and so on for each nation or region). Rather than return to this topic, 
about which many others have written ably, I will simply note that a reasonably robust notion of 
cinephilia can be maintained that does not require the impossible task of turning ourselves into 
late 1960s cinema-goers. Furthermore, teaching others to be cinephiles does not obviously 
require turning them into auteurists. My intentionally broad characterization of cinephilia is not 
meant to dislodge it from any of its historical manifestations but rather to capture a recurring 
tendency of some people to love film inordinately and find like-minded folks to share that love. 
Thus, I am not assuming at the outset that there is some late, great period of cinephilia that we 
should mourn, as Susan Sontag and Andrew O’Hehir have claimed.6 Nor am I assuming that 
cinephilia can’t ebb and flow or look different over time or be tied to various other historical 
trends like auteurism or the rise of online film discussion sites. However, if one wants to confine 
cinephilia to a narrower historical phenomenon, teaching students to be cinephiles will be 
impossible (because it requires becoming uprooted from one’s own historical moment) or one 
will have to consider whether my claims about cinephilia match the alternative conception of 
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cinephilia that the reader endorses. 
Cinephilia, as I will use it, has two aspects: a set of practices and a cluster of virtues that 
arise out of those practices. For some readers the term “virtues” calls up associations with purity 
and humility and other concepts that Nietzsche dismissed as “slave morality.”7 However, nothing 
so narrow or puritanical is intended or warranted. Virtues are the habits necessary to pursue the 
practices from which they arise or to pursue a life that on reflection seems best.8 The key point is 
that to engage in certain practices one must develop character traits to perform well at those 
practices; these are the virtues.9 
My approach is grounded in the practices of cinephiles. To be a cinephile one mustn’t 
just watch films or love a particular sort of movie. Someone who only loves musicals or horror 
movies is not a cinephile. Cinephiles are omnivores, consuming studio and independent features, 
new and old, domestic and international.10 They might be academics, but their interest in film is 
not limited to their academic research. They might not be academics, but they take thoughtful 
writing on cinema seriously, whether it is based in the academy or not.11 Recently, many 
cinephiles have migrated online, prompting reflection about the new era of cinephilia and its 
relation to technology, criticism, production, and viewing platforms. Historically, cinephiles 
have valorized the experience of watching a film in a theater, and many continue to support the 
screening of films in their original format (a projected film print when possible, a carefully 
restored digital copy when available, and always in the original aspect ratio).12 In the next 
section, I will address the virtues that arise out of these practices. 
While readers of this volume are likely to have some interest or stake in the definition of 
cinephilia and be familiar with the many recent volumes discussing it, they might not be as 
familiar with discussions of the good life, the second concept to play a large role in what follows. 
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So I will briefly lay out a conceptual and historical map to orient readers.  
The problem of the good life is the problem of how to live. What should I do? How 
should I act toward someone who has wronged me? Would I be happier in a bustling city, in the 
suburbs, or in the country? Should I become a doctor or a professor or a professional 
snowboarder? To answer these questions (especially the latter two) requires judgments based on 
knowing particulars about oneself. To answer these questions also requires making judgments 
about what any person should do, or what any person with my interests, abilities, etc., should do. 
Philosophers typically focus on this second set of judgments. In doing so, we consider whether 
there are certain features that any life must have to be called good (say, close friendships, or 
work one finds fulfilling) or whether there are many different kinds of good life.  
A problem with any discussion of the good life is that there are a number of issues that 
run together that might plausibly be kept distinct. Roughly, we could distinguish among living a 
morally good life, a happy life, and a meaningful life. A morally good life is one that achieves 
excellence in developing character, or acting meritoriously, or having good consequences follow 
from one’s attitudes and actions.13 A happy life is one that has the maximum amount of pleasure 
and the least amount of pain, or whatever the correct account of well-being is.14 A meaningful 
life is harder to define, but the concept is meant to capture a potential third set of questions we 
might ask about our lives, questions like, “Did my life make a difference?” and “Is this the kind 
of life I want to be living?” One might be happy from moment to moment but still feel that 
something is missing; whatever is missing is what would make for a meaningful life. For 
instance, Susan Wolf argues that two popular claims about the meaningfulness of life is that one 
should live passionately (you should do what you love) and one should be involved in a project 
larger than oneself (your life should impact others), and she articulates a theory of the 
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meaningfulness of life that combines these two qualities.15  
In addition to those three axes of evaluation, we could also consider a few historically 
important questions relating to the good life. First, is happiness an emotion, a mood, or a state of 
being? The ancient Greek discussion of eudaimonia, sometimes translated into English as 
“happiness,” usually focused on this third definition. Beginning with Plato’s Socratic dialogues, 
eudaimonia is a life well lived; it is well-being or flourishing. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle claim 
that eudaimonia includes virtue, so a morally good life is necessary for the happy 
(eudaimonistic) life. This introduces the second major question: Is being virtuous part of what it 
is to lead a happy life, or could one be virtuous and still be unhappy (in the rich sense of 
flourishing)? For Plato, the virtuous life is the happy life; the virtuous person is flourishing, even 
if hated, slandered, and pained. For Aristotle, virtue is required for happiness, but it is not 
sufficient for it (that is, one cannot be truly happy unless one is virtuous, but being virtuous does 
not guarantee a happy life). 
Returning to the issue of what happiness is, Epicurus is the most famous proponent of 
hedonism, the view that happiness can be reduced to experiences of pleasure and pain. Virtue 
allows one to be happy (by allowing one to practice self-control to reach delayed pleasures, for 
instance), but virtue is not identical to happiness, says Epicurus. Medieval philosophers tended to 
reorient happiness around knowing God (especially in the beatific vision), and they emphasized 
mercy, forgiveness, and especially love as virtues, which ancient philosophers (especially the 
Stoics) tended to downplay or outright disdain.  
Starting in the seventeenth century, questions of rightness (how one should act) were 
typically separated from questions of goodness (what is valuable). This directly affects questions 
about the nature of the good life, because it was no longer assumed that doing what is right will 
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promote one’s own or others’ well-being. So for Kant, happiness is a fleeting psychological state 
dependent on external circumstances and thus poorly suited for a universal, necessary theory of 
right action, which could only be based on rationality. However, for hedonists like John Stuart 
Mill and Henry Sidgwick, pleasure is valuable and pain is disvaluable, and they argue that right 
action is promoting pleasure and minimizing pain for all. By explicitly casting moral theory as 
universal (treating all persons as moral subjects) and independent of one’s own well-being, 
modern ethicists faced a problem of illustrating the motivating reasons for acting for the sake of 
others when that disadvantages one’s own well-being. That is, “why be moral?” takes on new 
importance. (Ancient eudaimonistic theories do not face a strong version of this because it is 
rational and good to act in one’s self-interest, and medieval theists identified one’s self-interest 
with God’s plan for one’s life.) Additionally, fewer modern than medieval philosophers identify 
the good life with knowledge or love of God. 
Among the critics of modern moral theory (as I’ve glossed it), Nietzsche opposed its 
reliance on “slave” virtues, its reliance on a false theory of agency, and its denial of life; Leo 
Tolstoy opposed its displacement of faith from the core of living; and Elizabeth Anscombe 
argued that secular, modern moral theories failed to give an adequate basis for their frequent use 
of “ought” and “right.” Tolstoy is particularly interesting because he formulates a question that 
dominated the twentieth century discussions. Even if one is in a psychological state of happiness, 
there seems to be a question that remains: “Is this all there is?” Or in Tolstoy’s phrasing, “What 
is it for? What does it lead to?” Tolstoy’s question (and Nietzsche’s answer) was picked up by 
Sartre, Camus, and others who thought that there was no answer to Tolstoy’s question. Sartre, for 
instance, says existentialism begins with the realization that there is no creator God, and thus 
there is no design or purpose or human nature that could provide meaning or ground ethics.16 
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Recently there has been an influx of new philosophical writing on the meaning of life, 
but no obvious trends have emerged.17 
To summarize, in discussing the good life, we could focus on one of three axes of 
evaluation: goodness, happiness, and meaningfulness. These might be distinct, or they might be 
overlapping, or they might be identical. Some define goodness as what leads to one’s happiness, 
some argue that meaningfulness reduces to goodness, and so on. When discussing the connection 
between cinephilia and the good life, I am using “good life” in the broadest sense, which 
includes the morally good life, the happy life, and the meaningful life. My pedagogical model 
posits cinephilia’s potential contribution to university instructors’ attempts to encourage students 
to seek lives that are meaningful, happy, and good. 
<A>Cinephilia and the Good Life<\> 
 Let’s assume for the moment that one of the goals of instruction in philosophy is to 
encourage students to reflect on, explore, and attempt to live a life that is happy, meaningful, and 
good. (I address objections to this assumption in the next section.) What can cinephilia 
contribute? We don’t need to make all students into cinephiles, but by exhibiting our own 
cinephilia and encouraging it in our students, we can develop transferable virtues, by which I 
mean those character traits that cinephiles exhibit but which would serve anyone well. 
Cinephiles take joy in discovering new things. They enjoy not just new films or 
recognized classics, but forgotten films, actors whose work is no longer appreciated, 
cinematographers who capture surprising moments, and other talents who contributed to making 
films. Cinephiles are fond of treading off the beaten path, looking for hidden gems, or simply 
enjoying the small pleasures of a mediocre film. They wonder why others love what they love, so 
they pursue new experiences to see if they can love it, too. Curiosity and adventurousness are 
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what I am calling transferable virtues. People who are curious and adventurous in their tastes are 
more likely to live lives that are happy, good, and meaningful. So even if our students never fall 
in love with film, they will have seen what it is like to be curious and adventurous in one’s tastes 
and with those attributes modeled they can transfer them into their own passions. Other 
transferable virtues of the cinephile are careful attention, joy in exploration, appreciation of 
beauty and achievement and innovation in art, and desire for understanding. These are some of 
the most useful traits to develop because they lead to other valuable goods. 
In addition to practicing these virtues, cinephiles form communities to share their 
discoveries. Cinephilia drives one to seek out like-minded persons, and, as Jonathan Rosenbaum 
reminds us in his calls for a stronger cinephiliac community, it should also encourage 
information sharing that crosses affiliations (e.g., academics, journalists, filmmakers).18 To turn 
to one of Rosenbaum’s Movie Mutations correspondents, Adrian Martin advocates a cinephilia 
that embodies “mutual reflection,” “cross-cultural understanding,” and looks “to find certain 
insights into our own situations whenever we can.”19 I doubt that I am alone in wishing my 
students would find ways of navigating beyond their own experiences with curiosity and 
reflection. This is a partial list of the character traits that cinephilia develops, and it doesn’t yet 
include the pursuit of and appreciation of beauty or resonant stories and characters. If we can 
find a way to have students become cinephiles--or if not become cinephiles, at least see these 
virtues modeled by cinephiles--then our students have an opportunity to evaluate those traits and 
decide if they want to pursue them. 
Would turning our students into cinephiles make them happier? There’s no reason to 
think that cinephiles are any more or less happy from moment to moment than other people, but 
we probably don’t need to make these interpersonal judgments. Instead, we can demonstrate to 
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students what it is like to have short-term and long-term goals that are united around a 
conception of the sort of life we want to live. While modeling that life, we need not impose our 
goals on them, but we can show how a life involving those goals creates benchmarks by which 
we can measure our pursuit of a happy, meaningful life. Even if our goals are set for purely 
subjective reasons, our lives are objectively worse when we do not achieve the goals that are 
important to us. 
For instance, I am waiting to watch Jacques Tati’s Playtime until I can see it projected in 
70mm. However, with the conversion of commercial theaters to digital projectors, the 
destruction and decay of most of the film prints ever made, and the fact that I probably live a 
thousand miles from the nearest active, working 70mm projector, it is unlikely that I will ever 
attain this goal. Now, would my life be some great failure if I never saw this? No, not a great 
failure. But would it be a little worse? Yes, I think so. That I care about this goal makes it 
modestly important in a way that it wouldn’t be modestly important to someone who didn’t have 
this care. Philosophers often focus on whether there are particular objective goods that all people 
should have, but I will make only the more modest claim that it is plausible that some things are 
good for a person at least partly because the individual values them, so we can objectively 
evaluate lives based on whether they achieve goals that they have set. If someone wants to have 
children and they do have children, their lives can be judged as better than if they never had 
children. If someone wants to be remembered as a kind and generous person, but they are 
remembered as a cruel and selfish person, then their life is worse by a standard that mattered to 
them.20  
With this objective standard of meeting subjectively determined goals, we can determine 
what sort of life would be the most likely to make us happy, help us find meaning, and develop 
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the character traits necessary for this life. By modeling this for students, they may become 
cinephiles who adopt those same goals and virtues, or (more likely) they find their own 
communities, practices, and goals that they can use to organize their life. This is a much richer, 
more long-lasting, and more important set of goals than the content-bearer assumption connected 
to the philosophy through film model. In cinephilia, what the film says, illustrates, or argues is 
but one of many worthwhile ways of engaging with a film. Loving films, searching out new 
experiences, having transformative aesthetic experiences, appreciating unexpected moments of 
wonder in otherwise unremarkable films--these and others suggest a more comprehensive 
approach to films and a more comprehensive approach to life. These further ways of engaging 
with films are also more in line with the long-term goals we should be considering when we are 
teaching. If we want students who don’t just learn what’s on the syllabus, but who learn to love 
learning itself; if we want students who don’t just read the assignments, but who seek out new 
information; if we want students who don’t expect to receive passively content provided by the 
instructor, but who make their education their own; then we will want to develop those character 
traits like curiosity, ingenuity, humility, self-reliance, and artistic appreciation. These traits aren’t 
just valuable for the cinephile, but for everyone. 
To clarify, my argument has not been that cinephilia is required to live a good life. One 
ugly consequence of such a strong view would be that anyone who had lived without access to 
cinema could not have lived a good life, an absurd thesis that would mean 99% of the people 
ever to have lived could not have lived a good life. My claim is that the qualities distinctive of 
cinephilia are those very qualities that plausibly contribute to a good life or, at least, provide one 
model for students of how to pursue a life of their choosing. The precise object of those qualities 
(what is loved, what is appreciated, what arouses curiosity) could be most anything. (I do think 
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there are some restrictions on what one could love in living a good life; loving the torture of 
animals is off-limits, for instance.) What matters for the argument is (1) that cinephilia exhibits 
these virtues and (2) that students often arrive in college aware of film, engaged with film, and 
primed to fall further in love with film, which makes cinephilia an excellent entry point for the 
discussion of the good life. 
<A>The Good Life? Really?<\> 
Some readers might be surprised by the emphasis I have placed on the role of the good 
life within academic philosophy. Many now think that such questions are no longer discussed. I 
am happy to report that the academic study of philosophy, despite recent reports to the contrary, 
still asks the classical question, “what is a good life?” Despite this, a cottage industry has 
developed out of the claim that universities in general, and the humanities in particular, have 
given up on the big questions about humans’ place in the universe and the meaning or meanings 
of the lives we lead. 
The ur-text for these discussions over the last twenty-five years is Allan Bloom’s The 
Closing of the American Mind. In detailing the “decomposition of the university,” he claims, “In 
it [the humanities] there is no semblance of order, no serious account of what should and should 
not belong, or of what its disciplines are trying to accomplish or how.”21 Thus, students are left 
adrift without the texts or the tools to answer the big questions to which they seek answers. Many 
more books and articles followed in Bloom’s wake, often explicitly political in nature.22 Roger 
Kimball’s Tenured Radicals (which went through three editions) and Dinesh D’Souza’s Illiberal 
Education (which launched his public career), to name two prominent examples, combined 
Bloom’s criticism that universities had stopped asking the big questions with the politicized 
polemics that recalled God and Man at Yale by William F. Buckley, Jr.23 Such jeremiads often 
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focus on perceived threats to established disciplines and methods. Kimball names the purported 
threats. “It is no secret that the academic study of the humanities in this country is in a state of 
crisis. Proponents of deconstruction, feminist studies, and other politically motivated challenges 
to the traditional tenets of humanistic study have by now become the dominant voice in the 
humanities departments of many of our best colleges and universities.”24 These perceived 
challenges were often tied to concerns over political correctness, which was said to have a 
chilling effect on universities.25 
These stories often focus on departments other than philosophy because these trends have 
been less pronounced in philosophy than in other humanities departments. The decline in writing 
about the good life in Anglo-American philosophy is largely due to a twentieth-century 
movement known as analytic philosophy. This family of movements within academic philosophy 
emphasized conceptual analysis, valorized science as the only route to understanding the world, 
posed (then later rejected, then still later reconsidered) a deep logical grammar discoverable 
within language, and dismissed aesthetic, religious, and ethical claims as either without meaning 
or simply expressions of emotional states with no cognitive content. Elements of this approach 
live on, particularly in what is increasingly called “naturalist” philosophy. For many of those 
linked to this family of traditions, questions about the good life appeared meaningless, 
irresolvable, or (minimally) not philosophy’s primary aim. As Scott Soames writes in his 
important history of the period,  
<EXT>In general, philosophy done in the analytic tradition aims at truth and 
knowledge, as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement. There is very little in 
the way of practical or inspirational guides in the art of living to be found, and 
very much in the way of philosophical theories that purport to reveal the truth 
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about a given domain of inquiry. In general, the goal in analytic philosophy is to 
discover what is true, not to provide a useful recipe for living one’s life.26<\> 
Given the philosophers that Soames focuses on (a coterie of very influential German, British, 
American, and Australian philosophers), this is largely right.27 Put succinctly, it was not so much 
the rise of cultural studies, deconstruction, or other late-twentieth-century movements that 
redirected philosophy away from asking about the good life, but a commitment to philosophy as 
a science or as a preparation for a scientific understanding of the world that displaced this 
question.28 
Even though this was the major trend in English-language philosophy for much of the 
twentieth century, it is not as though the question was ever too far from philosophers’ minds. 
Even restricting ourselves to England and America, pragmatists like William James, John 
Dewey, and Jane Addams, neo-Thomists influenced by Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, 
and of course the many existentialists, phenomenologists, postmodernists, idealists, and 
historians of philosophy continued asking the classical questions. Saying that philosophy in the 
twentieth century ignored questions about the meaning of life conflates analytic philosophy with 
all of English-language philosophy. 
Expanding beyond philosophy again, there is something troubling about these critics’ 
claim that rise of cultural studies somehow diminished or removed the central questions of how 
we should live. In fact, one of the recurring themes of cultural studies is that any attempted 
depiction of the goodness or meaningfulness of life that restricts itself to only a few voices is 
unlikely to capture what is good or meaningful about people’s experiences. Studies of class, 
sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and more provide new ways of thinking about lives, not the 
suffocation of the most important questions. Other trends in the humanities, such as 
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deconstruction, are also meant to be individually liberating as one recognizes the problems 
inherent in the system one receives and employs tools to overcome those problems. Whether one 
restricts oneself to the trends within philosophy or within the humanities generally, it was never 
the case that questions of the good life were absent. Perhaps more importantly, so what if they 
were? They need not be now. 
<A>Is This Our Role as Educators?<\> 
A second criticism is that, regardless of what has been taught, the good life, or cinephilia, 
or both should not be part of what philosophy departments teach. My focus on laying out the 
theoretical space and showing that cinephilia has a place in academic pedagogy in philosophy is 
very odd in a certain way. Cinephilia is, etymologically, historically, and avowedly, a love of 
cinema; perhaps, too, instructing someone in the good life is similarly paternalistic. What I have 
been advocating is thus something strange: we should teach students to love or tell them how to 
live. Objections to this idea are of two general sorts: love cannot be taught, and love ought not be 
taught. I’ll start with the latter. 
On a particular construal of the purpose of education, love has no place. Education exists 
to create citizens, or future job-holders, or future job-creators. Or, as it is sometimes more 
narrowly cast, publicly funded education should serve the public good, which is then typically 
defined in terms of “job skills.”29 On this view of education, teaching students to love anything is 
off-point at best and counterproductive at worst. I cannot respond adequately to this line of 
thought, but, although ubiquitous, this view is both false and pernicious. Even on the assumption 
that this narrow view of education is correct, developing a love of learning, facility with cultural 
difference, and careful attention are precisely the sort of skills that will make for successful 
citizens, employees, and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, as some of the considerations of the good 
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life draw out, having a job and participating in society are instrumental goods that bring about 
those things that are truly valuable: happiness, goodness, meaning. To focus only on those 
instrumental goods would be a potentially devastating mistake. 
On the point that love cannot be taught, surely this is right in some strict sense. It would 
be very odd for me to evaluate my students at the end of the semester according to how much 
they love my partner or their partner or God or science or The Court Jester or Juliette Binoche. 
We can’t both “teach to the test” and require that our students love. We don’t list “love” under 
Course Objectives on the syllabus. (Although perhaps words like “appreciate,” “deepen,” and 
“engage” might sneak the idea in surreptitiously.) This narrow understanding of teaching, 
though, is not the only way to teach. We can, to use terms I have repeated throughout, model 
love for our students and encourage them to find something they love and pursue it. We are 
fostering an ability to love and the ability to choose (or be chosen by) what they will love. Many 
of them, sadly, won’t love films as we do, but we can show them the benefits of passionately 
loving something so that your whole person is engaged in the pursuit of it. 
<A>Applications and Conclusions<\> 
How does teaching philosophy of film in the cinephiliac mode look? In this final section, 
I will discuss specifics of how I have used this approach in introduction to philosophy (100-
level) and philosophy of film (300-level) courses. After motivating this approach further, I turn 
to specifics. Some of what I say here will be relevant to anyone teaching film outside of cinema 
studies departments, who wants to blend their discipline’s methods and questions with those 
from cinema studies. These hurdles are lessened somewhat for departments with strong 
institutional, historical, and methodological connections to cinema studies, such as 
communication studies, American studies, and comparative literature; students are more likely to 
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be familiar with the tools, readings, and approaches that often developed in communication 
between these disciplines. The pedagogical problem, for those of us who teach with films but are 
not housed in cinema studies departments, is double-edged: increase students’ theoretical and 
affective engagement with films, while also introducing them to our own discipline’s questions 
and methods. For those of us committed to incorporating the insights and perspectives of cinema 
studies in our courses, the time constraints of a semester are real. Furthermore, it is 
pedagogically imprudent to delay the material that students came to study by introducing a lot of 
theoretical groundwork whose value will only become apparent later.  
On these very real teaching concerns, the philosophy and pop culture books are little 
help. Philosophy through film essays and books rarely engage with writing from outside of 
philosophy, so teaching from them does little to introduce students to the questions and methods 
of other disciplines. Those who teach and write with the philosophy of film approach often 
downplay or dismiss scholarship in cinema studies, which has created an information silo, with 
philosophical writing separated from film historical and theoretical writing. 
One option would be to leave films out of the curriculum. However, it is not in the best 
interests of our students or ourselves to teach films only in cinema studies courses. No discipline 
should have exclusive claim to a set of texts or cultural objects, even if the discipline is as 
methodologically diverse as cinema studies. Additionally, cinema studies thrives on 
interdisciplinarity. The field benefits from the work done in adjacent disciplines to illuminate 
concepts, generate ideas, and refine approaches. Finally, students are often very familiar with 
filmic texts, even if their filmic literacy is underdeveloped, so other disciplines can provide 
richer educational experiences by incorporating films. The ubiquity of films, their affective 
potential, their social importance, their interest to students--there are simply too many 
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pedagogical reasons to teach with films for us to ignore them completely. 
As a potential solution for philosophers who love film, want to use films in our teaching, 
but are wary of or disappointed in the existing methods, I have suggested that modeling 
cinephilia encourages students to reflect on those practices and character traits that are possibly 
constitutive of a life that is happy, meaningful, and good. In connecting cinephilia to the good 
life, we offer a richer approach to the use of films in the philosophy classroom and connect the 
theoretical questions of the good life to a practical instantiation of one answer to them. How 
might the model I have described work in the classroom? To extend and apply the approach I 
have described and defended to this point, I will lay out two examples from my own teaching. 
The first is from a 300-level Philosophy of Film course; the second is from a 100-level 
Introduction to Philosophy course. 
Early in my 300-level Philosophy of Film course, taught at a state university to students 
who often have little or no background in either philosophy or cinema studies, we watch an 
entire film together. The last two years, I have screened Coherence, a 2012 micro-budget 
narrative feature from writer-director James Ward Byrkit and producer Lene Bausager. After 
giving students the title and no further information, after the opening credits sequence, at 
approximately the 20-minute mark, at the 40-minute mark, and at the end of the film, I pause the 
film and ask students to write down every question they can think of. I then collect their 
questions (usually by e-mail), collate them, and then as a class project I put the questions up on 
the screen in an editable document. Together we group the questions into categories, discussing 
which ones can be answered by later events or close watching of the film and which need 
additional thought or research. 
The point of watching the film together is not to get them to ask philosophers’ standard 
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questions of what the film is saying or arguing. In fact, I choose Coherence in part because it 
refuses to answer philosophical questions like “what is the explanation for these events?” and “is 
this metaphysically possible?” and “does this character make the ethically correct choice?” 
Rather, I encourage students to ask as many different questions as they can. Typically, most of 
their questions regard plotting (what will happen next?) or request clarification (e.g., what’s the 
relationship between these two characters?). Some questions open up further discussion: why did 
the filmmakers choose a particular aesthetic, how did they achieve that aesthetic, why do certain 
filmmaking roles show up in opening credits, how are we encouraged to empathize or identify 
with certain characters, what should we make of viewers’ moral objections to characters’ 
behavior, does the film settle questions about multiverses and branching spacetimes, what are we 
expected to assume about the rules in fictional universes, how does the film’s independent 
production and lack of A-list stars affect the way that we view the film, and so on. Encouraging 
students to ask their own questions of films and learning from the questions that others ask are 
two of the best ways I know to help students understand how and why to love films.  
My ultimate goal in this course assignment is to show how the tools, methods, and 
questions of philosophy and related disciplines can help students pose and answer their own 
questions and the questions they had never thought to ask before. It is important not to set the 
bounds too early of what is or is not a legitimate question (or a legitimate philosophical 
question). With questions that matter to them (because they asked them), we then ask figure out 
how to answer them. What new knowledge do we need? What tools do we need? By not limiting 
ourselves at the outset to only the question of what a film is arguing or claiming, students realize 
that to learn what they want to learn and to view films in exciting new ways, they will need to 
read and discuss much more widely than what philosophers or critics have written about a 
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particular film. Unlike the philosophy through film approach, which encourages students to focus 
on a single thematic or narrative element, this approach is both student-started and wide-ranging. 
Unlike another common philosophy of film approach, this assignment requires students to pay 
close attention to a particular film, rather than discuss structural elements common to groups of 
films. By posing questions before covering topics, students can be encouraged to see how later 
class sessions will build off questions they already have while also posing new questions they 
hadn’t thought to ask. Ideally, the course topics can even be amended to focus on the questions 
that students raised in these opening sessions.  
For subsequent class sessions, I assign readings from philosophers, historians, film 
theorists, journalists, critics, and filmmakers to help students see how people with diverse 
professional interests can approach questions regarding medium-specificity or the sanctity of the 
theater or auteurism in divergent and overlapping ways. The questions I ask in each class session 
contain a mixture of standard philosophical questions (such as the role of a filmmaker’s 
intentions in determining a film’s meaning and whether narratives can make arguments) and 
questions that students are familiar with but are unlikely to have posed in a classroom (such as 
the ethics of spoiling a movie’s end and of texting in theaters, what obligations “based on a true 
story” claims create for the filmmakers and the audience, and what makes a film performance 
distinct from other types of performance).30 This models active scholarship that doesn’t stop at 
disciplinary boundaries or even at the classroom door, while broadening students’ perspective on 
what can be thought and done. 
Blending methods, viewpoints, and issues from diverse sources is more difficult in an 
introductory philosophy class. I have experimented with using films in the way described, but I 
find that only in classes with small numbers and alternative schedules (such as intensive, 
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between-semester courses common at some American schools) is it effective. However, a 
simpler version can work in a standard semester-long introduction to philosophy course. Rather 
than use films as illustrations of the theories we discuss (The Matrix as skeptical scenario, for 
instance), we can model cinephiliac virtues through how we present films. To give one example, 
when discussing what activities or experiences would make for the best sort of life, students 
inevitably raise the question of whether there are objectively true, interpersonal judgments about 
what sort of experiences are best. At this point, I might show a favorite Buster Keaton short, such 
as The Goat. Few of my students are familiar with films from the silent (pre-synchronized sound) 
era, so not only do they have a new experience (which lends itself to talking about whether 
seeking out new experiences is part of living a good life) but I can ramble on passionately about 
the genius of Keaton and his stock cast and crew, the value of laughing, learning to appreciate 
how technology and film style interrelate, and any number of seeming digressions. Students 
don’t just discuss the value of new experiences; they have a new experience (a positive one, I 
would hope, with Keaton). Curiosity and joy in discovery are key cinephiliac virtues, and 
creating an environment in which students can experience those is an important part of 
education. Exhibiting how to harness one’s passions for film, or anything else (within limit), into 
worthwhile pursuits is part of what we can do as educators. 
One of my emphases in this final section has been displacing a topic-based approach to a 
question-encouraging model of teaching with film. Both new and experienced teachers can fall 
into the trap of teaching so as to cover the material. In our attempts to cover the material, we 
shift the focus from students learning, exploring, and improving to checking items off a list. 
There are often sound pedagogical reasons for teaching the material we do (e.g., students need 
proficiency at a skill or familiarity with a topic to take the next course in a sequence), but there 
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are ways to fight the urge to fill the course with topics to cover (and thus items to check off a 
list) rather than on student-focused educational goals. Rediscovering our own love for what we 
teach, reflecting on that, then finding ways to encourage our students to love and pursue what 
interests them is one of the joys and challenges of teaching—and surely must urge us toward our 
own cultivations of the good life. 
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